The original paper is in English. Non-English content has been machine-translated and may contain typographical errors or mistranslations. ex. Some numerals are expressed as "XNUMX".
Copyrights notice
The original paper is in English. Non-English content has been machine-translated and may contain typographical errors or mistranslations. Copyrights notice
BDS(방송 배포 시스템)는 데이터 공급자가 콘텐츠를 암호화된 형식으로 방송하고 각 가입자에게 비밀 암호 해독 키가 포함된 디코더를 제공하는 방송 채널을 통해 디지털 콘텐츠를 배포하는 시스템입니다. 배신자는 방송의 암호를 해독할 수 있는 정보를 제공하는 가입자입니다. 해적 디코더가 체포되었을 때 적어도 한 명의 반역자가 식별될 수 있는 경우 BDS는 반역자 추적이라고 합니다. 데이터 공급자가 디코더를 회수하지 않고 가입자가 콘텐츠를 얻는 것을 방지할 수 있는 경우 BDS는 가입자 제외라고 합니다. 본 논문에서는 가입자 배제와 배신자 추적을 동시에 수행하는 효율적인 BDS를 제안한다. 우리는 임계값 암호 시스템과 유사한 수학을 사용합니다. 제안된 BDS에서 제외되는 최대 가입자 수는 최소한 한 명의 반역자가 식별될 수 있는 연합 내 최대 반역자 수에 도달합니다. 우리는 ElGamal 암호화 시스템이 공격에 대해 안전하고 이산 로그 문제가 어려운 경우에만 제안된 BDS가 암호문 전용 공격에 대해 안전하다는 것을 증명합니다. 제안된 BDS는 가입자 배제, 배신자 추적, 모든 배신자 식별, 블랙박스 추적, 공개키 시스템 등의 기능을 모두 만족하는 최초의 BDS이다.
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부
Maki YOSHIDA, Toru FUJIWARA, "A Subscriber-Excluding and Traitor-Tracing Broadcast Distribution System" in IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals,
vol. E84-A, no. 1, pp. 247-255, January 2001, doi: .
Abstract: A broadcast distribution system (BDS) is a system for the distribution of digital contents over broadcast channel where the data supplier broadcasts the contents in encrypted form and gives each subscriber a decoder containing a secret decryption key. A traitor is a subscriber who offers the information which allows to decrypt the broadcast. When a pirate decoder is captured, if at least one traitor can be identified from it, a BDS is said to be traitor-tracing. If the data supplier can prevent subscribers from obtaining the contents without recalling their decoders, a BDS is said to be subscriber-excluding. In this paper, we propose an efficient BDS which is both subscriber-excluding and traitor-tracing. We use similar mathematics to a threshold cryptosystem. In the proposed BDS, the maximum number of excluded subscribers reaches the maximum number of traitors in a coalition for which at least one traitor can be identified. We prove that the proposed BDS is secure against ciphertext-only attack if and only if ElGamal cryptosystem is secure against the attack and the discrete logarithm problem is hard. The proposed BDS is the first one which satisfies all the following features: Both subscriber-excluding and traitor-tracing, identifying all the traitors, black box tracing and public key system.
URL: https://global.ieice.org/en_transactions/fundamentals/10.1587/e84-a_1_247/_p
부
@ARTICLE{e84-a_1_247,
author={Maki YOSHIDA, Toru FUJIWARA, },
journal={IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals},
title={A Subscriber-Excluding and Traitor-Tracing Broadcast Distribution System},
year={2001},
volume={E84-A},
number={1},
pages={247-255},
abstract={A broadcast distribution system (BDS) is a system for the distribution of digital contents over broadcast channel where the data supplier broadcasts the contents in encrypted form and gives each subscriber a decoder containing a secret decryption key. A traitor is a subscriber who offers the information which allows to decrypt the broadcast. When a pirate decoder is captured, if at least one traitor can be identified from it, a BDS is said to be traitor-tracing. If the data supplier can prevent subscribers from obtaining the contents without recalling their decoders, a BDS is said to be subscriber-excluding. In this paper, we propose an efficient BDS which is both subscriber-excluding and traitor-tracing. We use similar mathematics to a threshold cryptosystem. In the proposed BDS, the maximum number of excluded subscribers reaches the maximum number of traitors in a coalition for which at least one traitor can be identified. We prove that the proposed BDS is secure against ciphertext-only attack if and only if ElGamal cryptosystem is secure against the attack and the discrete logarithm problem is hard. The proposed BDS is the first one which satisfies all the following features: Both subscriber-excluding and traitor-tracing, identifying all the traitors, black box tracing and public key system.},
keywords={},
doi={},
ISSN={},
month={January},}
부
TY - JOUR
TI - A Subscriber-Excluding and Traitor-Tracing Broadcast Distribution System
T2 - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SP - 247
EP - 255
AU - Maki YOSHIDA
AU - Toru FUJIWARA
PY - 2001
DO -
JO - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SN -
VL - E84-A
IS - 1
JA - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
Y1 - January 2001
AB - A broadcast distribution system (BDS) is a system for the distribution of digital contents over broadcast channel where the data supplier broadcasts the contents in encrypted form and gives each subscriber a decoder containing a secret decryption key. A traitor is a subscriber who offers the information which allows to decrypt the broadcast. When a pirate decoder is captured, if at least one traitor can be identified from it, a BDS is said to be traitor-tracing. If the data supplier can prevent subscribers from obtaining the contents without recalling their decoders, a BDS is said to be subscriber-excluding. In this paper, we propose an efficient BDS which is both subscriber-excluding and traitor-tracing. We use similar mathematics to a threshold cryptosystem. In the proposed BDS, the maximum number of excluded subscribers reaches the maximum number of traitors in a coalition for which at least one traitor can be identified. We prove that the proposed BDS is secure against ciphertext-only attack if and only if ElGamal cryptosystem is secure against the attack and the discrete logarithm problem is hard. The proposed BDS is the first one which satisfies all the following features: Both subscriber-excluding and traitor-tracing, identifying all the traitors, black box tracing and public key system.
ER -