The original paper is in English. Non-English content has been machine-translated and may contain typographical errors or mistranslations. ex. Some numerals are expressed as "XNUMX".
Copyrights notice
The original paper is in English. Non-English content has been machine-translated and may contain typographical errors or mistranslations. Copyrights notice
조회수
107
이 짧은 노트에서 우리는 KH-PKE(Keyed-Homomorphic Public Key Encryption)가 동형 암호화를 위한 선택 암호문 공격으로 도입된 키 복구 공격 및 암호문 유효성 공격으로부터 안전하다는 것을 공식적으로 보여줍니다.
Keita EMURA
the National Institute of Communications and Information Technology (NICT)
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부
Keita EMURA, "On the Security of Keyed-Homomorphic PKE: Preventing Key Recovery Attacks and Ciphertext Validity Attacks" in IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals,
vol. E104-A, no. 1, pp. 310-314, January 2021, doi: 10.1587/transfun.2020EAL2039.
Abstract: In this short note, we formally show that Keyed-Homomorphic Public Key Encryption (KH-PKE) is secure against key recovery attacks and ciphertext validity attacks that have been introduced as chosen-ciphertext attacks for homomorphic encryption.
URL: https://global.ieice.org/en_transactions/fundamentals/10.1587/transfun.2020EAL2039/_p
부
@ARTICLE{e104-a_1_310,
author={Keita EMURA, },
journal={IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals},
title={On the Security of Keyed-Homomorphic PKE: Preventing Key Recovery Attacks and Ciphertext Validity Attacks},
year={2021},
volume={E104-A},
number={1},
pages={310-314},
abstract={In this short note, we formally show that Keyed-Homomorphic Public Key Encryption (KH-PKE) is secure against key recovery attacks and ciphertext validity attacks that have been introduced as chosen-ciphertext attacks for homomorphic encryption.},
keywords={},
doi={10.1587/transfun.2020EAL2039},
ISSN={1745-1337},
month={January},}
부
TY - JOUR
TI - On the Security of Keyed-Homomorphic PKE: Preventing Key Recovery Attacks and Ciphertext Validity Attacks
T2 - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SP - 310
EP - 314
AU - Keita EMURA
PY - 2021
DO - 10.1587/transfun.2020EAL2039
JO - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SN - 1745-1337
VL - E104-A
IS - 1
JA - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
Y1 - January 2021
AB - In this short note, we formally show that Keyed-Homomorphic Public Key Encryption (KH-PKE) is secure against key recovery attacks and ciphertext validity attacks that have been introduced as chosen-ciphertext attacks for homomorphic encryption.
ER -