The original paper is in English. Non-English content has been machine-translated and may contain typographical errors or mistranslations. ex. Some numerals are expressed as "XNUMX".
Copyrights notice
The original paper is in English. Non-English content has been machine-translated and may contain typographical errors or mistranslations. Copyrights notice
DICING에 대한 캐시 공격이 제시됩니다. 캐시 공격은 CPU 캐시 미스 및 적중 정보를 사이드 채널 정보로 사용합니다. DICING은 eSTREAM에서 제안된 스트림 암호입니다. DICING에 대한 효과적인 공격은 이전에 보고된 바 없습니다. DICING은 키에 의존적인 S-box를 사용하고 첫 번째 S-box 레이어 이전에는 키 추가가 없기 때문에 기존의 캐시 공격은 어렵다고 판단됩니다. 따라서 우리는 변환의 특수한 기능을 사용하는 액세스 중심 캐시 공격을 조사했습니다. L 선택한 IV를 제공합니다. 또한 캐시 공격에서 얻은 정보에서 비밀 키를 얻는 데 필요한 계산 복잡성을 줄이는 방법도 조사했습니다. 총 40개를 고려하여 2비트 키 차등을 얻을 수 있었습니다.18 Pentium III 프로세서에서 IV를 선택했습니다. 획득된 키 차이로부터 128~2의 계산 복잡도로 XNUMX비트 비밀 키를 복구할 수 있습니다.49 2로63. 이 결과는 다른 공격 모델을 기반으로 한 새로운 캐시 공격이 실제 환경에서도 적용 가능함을 보여준다.
The copyright of the original papers published on this site belongs to IEICE. Unauthorized use of the original or translated papers is prohibited. See IEICE Provisions on Copyright for details.
부
Yukiyasu TSUNOO, Takeshi KAWABATA, Tomoyasu SUZAKI, Hiroyasu KUBO, Teruo SAITO, "Access-Driven Cache Attack on the Stream Cipher DICING Using the Chosen IV" in IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals,
vol. E93-A, no. 4, pp. 799-807, April 2010, doi: 10.1587/transfun.E93.A.799.
Abstract: A cache attack against DICING is presented. Cache attacks use CPU cache miss and hit information as side-channel information. DICING is a stream cipher that was proposed at eSTREAM. No effective attack on DICING has been reported before. Because DICING uses a key-dependent S-box and there is no key addition before the first S-box layer, a conventional cache attack is considered to be difficult. We therefore investigated an access-driven cache attack that employs the special features of transformation L to give the chosen IV. We also investigated reduction of the computational complexity required to obtain the secret key from the information gained in the cache attack. We were able to obtain a 40-bit key differential given a total of 218 chosen IVs on a Pentium III processor. From the obtained key differential, the 128-bit secret key could be recovered with computational complexity of from 249 to 263. This result shows that the new cache attack, which is based on a different attack model, is also applicable in an actual environment.
URL: https://global.ieice.org/en_transactions/fundamentals/10.1587/transfun.E93.A.799/_p
부
@ARTICLE{e93-a_4_799,
author={Yukiyasu TSUNOO, Takeshi KAWABATA, Tomoyasu SUZAKI, Hiroyasu KUBO, Teruo SAITO, },
journal={IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals},
title={Access-Driven Cache Attack on the Stream Cipher DICING Using the Chosen IV},
year={2010},
volume={E93-A},
number={4},
pages={799-807},
abstract={A cache attack against DICING is presented. Cache attacks use CPU cache miss and hit information as side-channel information. DICING is a stream cipher that was proposed at eSTREAM. No effective attack on DICING has been reported before. Because DICING uses a key-dependent S-box and there is no key addition before the first S-box layer, a conventional cache attack is considered to be difficult. We therefore investigated an access-driven cache attack that employs the special features of transformation L to give the chosen IV. We also investigated reduction of the computational complexity required to obtain the secret key from the information gained in the cache attack. We were able to obtain a 40-bit key differential given a total of 218 chosen IVs on a Pentium III processor. From the obtained key differential, the 128-bit secret key could be recovered with computational complexity of from 249 to 263. This result shows that the new cache attack, which is based on a different attack model, is also applicable in an actual environment.},
keywords={},
doi={10.1587/transfun.E93.A.799},
ISSN={1745-1337},
month={April},}
부
TY - JOUR
TI - Access-Driven Cache Attack on the Stream Cipher DICING Using the Chosen IV
T2 - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SP - 799
EP - 807
AU - Yukiyasu TSUNOO
AU - Takeshi KAWABATA
AU - Tomoyasu SUZAKI
AU - Hiroyasu KUBO
AU - Teruo SAITO
PY - 2010
DO - 10.1587/transfun.E93.A.799
JO - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
SN - 1745-1337
VL - E93-A
IS - 4
JA - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals
Y1 - April 2010
AB - A cache attack against DICING is presented. Cache attacks use CPU cache miss and hit information as side-channel information. DICING is a stream cipher that was proposed at eSTREAM. No effective attack on DICING has been reported before. Because DICING uses a key-dependent S-box and there is no key addition before the first S-box layer, a conventional cache attack is considered to be difficult. We therefore investigated an access-driven cache attack that employs the special features of transformation L to give the chosen IV. We also investigated reduction of the computational complexity required to obtain the secret key from the information gained in the cache attack. We were able to obtain a 40-bit key differential given a total of 218 chosen IVs on a Pentium III processor. From the obtained key differential, the 128-bit secret key could be recovered with computational complexity of from 249 to 263. This result shows that the new cache attack, which is based on a different attack model, is also applicable in an actual environment.
ER -