The original paper is in English. Non-English content has been machine-translated and may contain typographical errors or mistranslations. ex. Some numerals are expressed as "XNUMX".
Copyrights notice
The original paper is in English. Non-English content has been machine-translated and may contain typographical errors or mistranslations. Copyrights notice
우리는 경량 블록 암호 MIBS의 니블 그룹 차등 확산 특성을 기반으로 하는 새로운 차등 오류 공격 방법을 제안합니다. S-box 차등 분포의 통계적 규칙성을 기반으로 통계 모델을 구축한 후, 결함 주입 횟수, 공격 성공 확률, 키 복구 비트 간의 관계를 분석합니다. 이론적으로 메인 키를 복구하는 시간 복잡도는 2로 감소합니다.2 3개의 결함 그룹(총 12니블)을 30,31라운드에 주입할 때 최적의 조건입니다. 또한 기본 키에서 32비트를 복구하는 데 필요한 오류 주입 그룹 수에 대한 기대값인 62을 계산했습니다. 마지막으로 실험 데이터는 이론적 모델의 정확성을 검증합니다.
Yang GAO
State Key Laboratory for Mathematical Engineering and advanced computing
Yong-juan WANG
State Key Laboratory for Mathematical Engineering and advanced computing
Qing-jun YUAN
State Key Laboratory for Mathematical Engineering and advanced computing
Tao WANG
State Key Laboratory for Mathematical Engineering and advanced computing
Xiang-bin WANG
State Key Laboratory for Mathematical Engineering and advanced computing
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부
Yang GAO, Yong-juan WANG, Qing-jun YUAN, Tao WANG, Xiang-bin WANG, "Probabilistic Analysis of Differential Fault Attack on MIBS" in IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Information,
vol. E102-D, no. 2, pp. 299-306, February 2019, doi: 10.1587/transinf.2018EDP7168.
Abstract: We propose a new method of differential fault attack, which is based on the nibble-group differential diffusion property of the lightweight block cipher MIBS. On the basis of the statistical regularity of differential distribution of the S-box, we establish a statistical model and then analyze the relationship between the number of faults injections, the probability of attack success, and key recovering bits. Theoretically, time complexity of recovering the main key reduces to 22 when injecting 3 groups of faults (12 nibbles in total) in 30,31 and 32 rounds, which is the optimal condition. Furthermore, we calculate the expectation of the number of fault injection groups needed to recover 62 bits in main key, which is 3.87. Finally, experimental data verifies the correctness of the theoretical model.
URL: https://global.ieice.org/en_transactions/information/10.1587/transinf.2018EDP7168/_p
부
@ARTICLE{e102-d_2_299,
author={Yang GAO, Yong-juan WANG, Qing-jun YUAN, Tao WANG, Xiang-bin WANG, },
journal={IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Information},
title={Probabilistic Analysis of Differential Fault Attack on MIBS},
year={2019},
volume={E102-D},
number={2},
pages={299-306},
abstract={We propose a new method of differential fault attack, which is based on the nibble-group differential diffusion property of the lightweight block cipher MIBS. On the basis of the statistical regularity of differential distribution of the S-box, we establish a statistical model and then analyze the relationship between the number of faults injections, the probability of attack success, and key recovering bits. Theoretically, time complexity of recovering the main key reduces to 22 when injecting 3 groups of faults (12 nibbles in total) in 30,31 and 32 rounds, which is the optimal condition. Furthermore, we calculate the expectation of the number of fault injection groups needed to recover 62 bits in main key, which is 3.87. Finally, experimental data verifies the correctness of the theoretical model.},
keywords={},
doi={10.1587/transinf.2018EDP7168},
ISSN={1745-1361},
month={February},}
부
TY - JOUR
TI - Probabilistic Analysis of Differential Fault Attack on MIBS
T2 - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Information
SP - 299
EP - 306
AU - Yang GAO
AU - Yong-juan WANG
AU - Qing-jun YUAN
AU - Tao WANG
AU - Xiang-bin WANG
PY - 2019
DO - 10.1587/transinf.2018EDP7168
JO - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Information
SN - 1745-1361
VL - E102-D
IS - 2
JA - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Information
Y1 - February 2019
AB - We propose a new method of differential fault attack, which is based on the nibble-group differential diffusion property of the lightweight block cipher MIBS. On the basis of the statistical regularity of differential distribution of the S-box, we establish a statistical model and then analyze the relationship between the number of faults injections, the probability of attack success, and key recovering bits. Theoretically, time complexity of recovering the main key reduces to 22 when injecting 3 groups of faults (12 nibbles in total) in 30,31 and 32 rounds, which is the optimal condition. Furthermore, we calculate the expectation of the number of fault injection groups needed to recover 62 bits in main key, which is 3.87. Finally, experimental data verifies the correctness of the theoretical model.
ER -