The original paper is in English. Non-English content has been machine-translated and may contain typographical errors or mistranslations. ex. Some numerals are expressed as "XNUMX".
Copyrights notice
The original paper is in English. Non-English content has been machine-translated and may contain typographical errors or mistranslations. Copyrights notice
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공개입찰 경매에서 입찰자는 다른 입찰자의 예산을 알 수 있습니다. 따라서 입찰가격을 숨기는 봉인입찰 경매가 바람직하다. 그러나 이전의 봉인입찰 경매 프로토콜에서는 입찰자가 입찰 가격 이상의 자금을 보유하고 입찰자가 낙찰될 경우 자금을 강제로 회수하는 "자금 구속력" 속성을 제공하기가 어려웠습니다. . 따라서 이러한 프로토콜은 허위 입찰에 취약합니다. 이에 대한 해결책으로 많은 프로토콜에서는 입찰 단계 전에 각 입찰자가 입찰 가격보다 크거나 같은 보증금을 스마트 계약에 보내는 간단한 입금 방식을 사용합니다. 그러나 이 보증금은 최고 입찰 가격을 드러내므로 이 정보를 숨기는 것이 바람직합니다. 본 논문에서는 자금 구속력이 있는 자산을 제공하는 봉인입찰 경매 프로토콜을 제안합니다. 우리의 프로토콜은 입찰 가격과 최고 입찰 가격을 숨길 뿐만 아니라 동시에 자금 구속력을 제공합니다. 최고 입찰가를 숨기기 위해 일반적인 이더리움 거래와 일회성 주소로 자금을 보내기 위한 거래가 동일한 거래 구조를 가지고 있다는 점에 주목하여 구별이 불가능한 것으로 보입니다. 얼마나 많은 입찰 거래가 숨겨져 있는지 논의합니다. 우리는 또한 데이터 자체를 표시하지 않고 소스에서 데이터를 가져오는 검증자에게 데이터의 유효성을 증명하는 DECO(Zhang et al., CCS 2020)를 사용합니다. 마지막으로, 필요한 거래 수수료를 보여주는 구현을 제공하고 이를 단순 입금 방법을 사용하는 봉인 입찰 경매 프로토콜과 비교합니다.
Kota CHIN
University of Tsukuba
Keita EMURA
National Institute of Information and Communications Technology
Shingo SATO
Yokohama National University
Kazumasa OMOTE
University of Tsukuba
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부
Kota CHIN, Keita EMURA, Shingo SATO, Kazumasa OMOTE, "A Sealed-Bid Auction with Fund Binding: Preventing Maximum Bidding Price Leakage" in IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Information,
vol. E107-D, no. 5, pp. 615-624, May 2024, doi: 10.1587/transinf.2023DAP0002.
Abstract: In an open-bid auction, a bidder can know the budgets of other bidders. Thus, a sealed-bid auction that hides bidding prices is desirable. However, in previous sealed-bid auction protocols, it has been difficult to provide a “fund binding” property, which would guarantee that a bidder has funds more than or equal to the bidding price and that the funds are forcibly withdrawn when the bidder wins. Thus, such protocols are vulnerable to a false bidding. As a solution, many protocols employ a simple deposit method in which each bidder sends a deposit to a smart contract, which is greater than or equal to the bidding price, before the bidding phase. However, this deposit reveals the maximum bidding price, and it is preferable to hide this information. In this paper, we propose a sealed-bid auction protocol that provides a fund binding property. Our protocol not only hides the bidding price and a maximum bidding price, but also provides a fund binding property, simultaneously. For hiding the maximum bidding price, we pay attention to the fact that usual Ethereum transactions and transactions for sending funds to a one-time address have the same transaction structure, and it seems that they are indistinguishable. We discuss how much bidding transactions are hidden. We also employ DECO (Zhang et al., CCS 2020) that proves the validity of the data to a verifier in which the data are taken from a source without showing the data itself. Finally, we give our implementation which shows transaction fees required and compare it to a sealed-bid auction protocol employing the simple deposit method.
URL: https://global.ieice.org/en_transactions/information/10.1587/transinf.2023DAP0002/_f
부
@ARTICLE{e107-d_5_615,
author={Kota CHIN, Keita EMURA, Shingo SATO, Kazumasa OMOTE, },
journal={IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Information},
title={A Sealed-Bid Auction with Fund Binding: Preventing Maximum Bidding Price Leakage},
year={2024},
volume={E107-D},
number={5},
pages={615-624},
abstract={In an open-bid auction, a bidder can know the budgets of other bidders. Thus, a sealed-bid auction that hides bidding prices is desirable. However, in previous sealed-bid auction protocols, it has been difficult to provide a “fund binding” property, which would guarantee that a bidder has funds more than or equal to the bidding price and that the funds are forcibly withdrawn when the bidder wins. Thus, such protocols are vulnerable to a false bidding. As a solution, many protocols employ a simple deposit method in which each bidder sends a deposit to a smart contract, which is greater than or equal to the bidding price, before the bidding phase. However, this deposit reveals the maximum bidding price, and it is preferable to hide this information. In this paper, we propose a sealed-bid auction protocol that provides a fund binding property. Our protocol not only hides the bidding price and a maximum bidding price, but also provides a fund binding property, simultaneously. For hiding the maximum bidding price, we pay attention to the fact that usual Ethereum transactions and transactions for sending funds to a one-time address have the same transaction structure, and it seems that they are indistinguishable. We discuss how much bidding transactions are hidden. We also employ DECO (Zhang et al., CCS 2020) that proves the validity of the data to a verifier in which the data are taken from a source without showing the data itself. Finally, we give our implementation which shows transaction fees required and compare it to a sealed-bid auction protocol employing the simple deposit method.},
keywords={},
doi={10.1587/transinf.2023DAP0002},
ISSN={1745-1361},
month={May},}
부
TY - JOUR
TI - A Sealed-Bid Auction with Fund Binding: Preventing Maximum Bidding Price Leakage
T2 - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Information
SP - 615
EP - 624
AU - Kota CHIN
AU - Keita EMURA
AU - Shingo SATO
AU - Kazumasa OMOTE
PY - 2024
DO - 10.1587/transinf.2023DAP0002
JO - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Information
SN - 1745-1361
VL - E107-D
IS - 5
JA - IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Information
Y1 - May 2024
AB - In an open-bid auction, a bidder can know the budgets of other bidders. Thus, a sealed-bid auction that hides bidding prices is desirable. However, in previous sealed-bid auction protocols, it has been difficult to provide a “fund binding” property, which would guarantee that a bidder has funds more than or equal to the bidding price and that the funds are forcibly withdrawn when the bidder wins. Thus, such protocols are vulnerable to a false bidding. As a solution, many protocols employ a simple deposit method in which each bidder sends a deposit to a smart contract, which is greater than or equal to the bidding price, before the bidding phase. However, this deposit reveals the maximum bidding price, and it is preferable to hide this information. In this paper, we propose a sealed-bid auction protocol that provides a fund binding property. Our protocol not only hides the bidding price and a maximum bidding price, but also provides a fund binding property, simultaneously. For hiding the maximum bidding price, we pay attention to the fact that usual Ethereum transactions and transactions for sending funds to a one-time address have the same transaction structure, and it seems that they are indistinguishable. We discuss how much bidding transactions are hidden. We also employ DECO (Zhang et al., CCS 2020) that proves the validity of the data to a verifier in which the data are taken from a source without showing the data itself. Finally, we give our implementation which shows transaction fees required and compare it to a sealed-bid auction protocol employing the simple deposit method.
ER -